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Abstract 
 
We analyze the effect of committee formation on how corporate boards perform two main 
functions: setting CEO pay and overseeing the financial reporting process. The use of 
performance-based pay schemes induces the CEO to manipulate earnings, which leads to 
an increased need for board oversight. If the whole board is responsible for both functions, 
it is inclined to provide the CEO with a compensation scheme that is relatively insensitive 
to performance in order to reduce the burden of subsequent monitoring. When the functions 
are separated through the formation of committees, the compensation committee is willing 
to choose a higher pay-performance sensitivity as the increased cost of oversight is borne 
by the audit committee. Our model generates predictions relating the board committee 
structure to the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, the quality of board 
oversight, and the level of earnings management. 
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 1 Introduction
There is a widespread concern that the surge in CEO pay and recent spectacular cases
of accounting fraud reﬂect a failure of corporate governance. This concern prompted
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and is also reﬂected in a much
discussed book by Bebchuk and Fried (2004). Special attention in the discussion
has been devoted to the role of the boards of directors. In order to understand how
boards carry out their duties it is important to recognize that most board functions
are performed by committees. As a director interviewed by Lorsch and MacIver (1989)
remarked: “The work of the board is done in committees.” (See Adams (2003) for
further discussion.)
Delegating diﬀerent board functions to diﬀerent committees implies a separation
of tasks and functions on boards. The current paper develops a model to study how
the separation of tasks on boards aﬀects corporate governance.
To sketch the idea consider a CEO who is hired to work on a productive task. To
provide the CEO with incentives to work hard, the board links CEO pay to a perfor-
mance measure. However, the performance measure is imperfect in the sense that it
can be manipulated at the expense of long-term shareholder value. The compensation
scheme therefore not only motivates the CEO to work hard on the productive task,
but also encourages him to engage in manipulative actions. Such actions may include
accrual management or real earnings management such as reducing R&D expenses.
We refer to both types of activities as earnings management.
The board of directors has to perform the two functions of setting CEO pay and
overseeing the ﬁnancial reporting process (monitoring). Monitoring is privately costly
for directors but helps to curb earnings management. If the two functions are allo-
3cated to the same group of directors, they will take into account that linking CEO pay
closely to performance increases the CEO’s incentive to engage in manipulation and
hence puts them under greater pressure to perform their oversight duty. Directors
will therefore lower the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation in order
to reduce the need for monitoring. When committees are formed, functions are sepa-
rated, and the compensation committee will be responsible for setting CEO pay while
the audit committee will perform the oversight function. In such a case, the compen-
sation committee is much more willing to drive up the pay-performance sensitivity of
CEO compensation because it does not need to bear the cost of subsequent monitor-
ing. The increase in the pay-performance sensitivity that results from a separation of
functions not only inﬂuences the behavior of the CEO but also the quality of board
oversight. Once the CEO faces strong incentives to engage in earnings management,
the audit committee will ﬁnd it optimal to be more diligent in overseeing the ﬁnancial
reporting process.
The formation of committees per se does not guarantee a clean separation of
functions. After all, board members may sit on more than one committee, as well
as meet in general meetings. For this reason, task separation on boards not only
depends on the presence of committees, but on the degree of interaction between
these committees. We refer to this interaction as committee interlock. Committee
interlock is expected to increase, for example, if the fraction of directors who serve
on both committees is larger.
Our model predicts that a reduction in the degree of committee interlock, which
increases the level of task separation, results in a stronger pay-performance sensitiv-
ity of the CEO’s compensation contract. Clearly, a compensation scheme that links
p a ym o r et i g h t l yt op e r f o r m a n c ew i l li n c r e a s et h eC E O ’ sd i r e c ti n c e n t i v et oe n g a g e
4in manipulative behavior. However, this does not necessarily lead to an increase in
the (expected) level of earnings management as is widely argued by policymakers
and regulators. This is because providing the CEO with stronger incentives will also
increase the audit committee’s attention to overseeing the ﬁnancial reporting process.
Depending on which eﬀect is more powerful, the level of earnings management can
increase or decrease in equilibrium. The presence of these two countervailing forces
might explain why the recent study by Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) ﬁnds
no clear evidence of a link between the pay-performance sensitivity of executive com-
pensation and the incidence of accounting fraud.
However, a higher pay-performance sensitivity will result in more earnings man-
agement if the audit committee’s monitoring incentive is relatively low (e.g., due to
low stock ownership). But even in this case, linking pay closely to performance is not
necessarily undesirable. Shareholders may well accept the increase in earnings man-
agement that comes with an increase in the pay-performance sensitivity as greater
incentives also induce the CEO to work harder on the productive task.
There is a large and growing empirical literature that analyzes the relation be-
tween audit committee or board characteristics such as independence, size, and di-
rector background on the one hand and ﬁrm performance, CEO compensation, CEO
turnover, and earnings management on the other hand (see, e.g., Klein (2002), Farber
(2005), Larcker, Richardson, Tuna (2005), and, for a survey, Hermalin and Weisbach
(2003)). Our paper contributes to this literature by carving out another channel
through which the board structure has an impact: the separation of board functions.
Our analysis provides a number of testable predictions relating committee interlock
to the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, earnings management, and
board oversight.
5Theoretical contributions on boards have mainly focused on the question of how a
change in the board’s strength or its monitoring diligence aﬀects CEO compensation
and CEO turnover (Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Almazan and Suarez (2003), and
Hermalin (2005)). Closest to our paper is the work by Adams and Ferreira (2007),
who analyze the board’s two roles of advising and monitoring the CEO. They show
that if both functions are performed by the same group of directors, the CEO is
unwilling to reveal information that helps directors to provide advice, as directors
can also use the information for monitoring purposes. A separation of functions is
beneﬁcial because it serves as a substitute for a commitment not to use the revealed
information against the CEO. In contrast, in our setting, the separation of functions
changes how the compensation committee accounts for the cost of monitoring when
choosing the pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s compensation contract. With
separated responsibilities, the compensation committee is more willing to provide
strong incentives to the CEO, which puts the audit committee under greater pressure
to diligently perform the oversight task.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present the model. In section
3 we show how task separation on boards inﬂuences the board’s decision making and
determine the optimal degree of committee interlock. Empirical implications are
discussed in section 4. We conclude in section 5.
2M o d e l
There are three players: shareholders, the board of directors, and the CEO. The
board of directors has to perform the two functions of setting CEO pay and over-
seeing the ﬁnancial reporting process. These functions are delegated to two board
6committees, the compensation committee and the audit committee. When designing
the compensation scheme for the CEO, the compensation committee must take into
account that the performance measure is manipulable through earnings management.
To control earnings management, the compensation committee can either lower the
pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s compensation contract or the audit com-
mittee can increase the eﬀort devoted to overseeing the ﬁnancial reporting process.
We analyze how the formation and structure of board committees aﬀects how the
board uses these two instruments and their interrelation.
T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s .
Stage 1. The ﬁrm is established and shareholders hire a CEO to run the ﬁrm.
Shareholders also employ a board of directors and decide on how the board is orga-
nized. That is, committees are formed and directors are allocated to the diﬀerent
committees. The formation and structure of committees aﬀect the degree of task
separation on the board. The extent to which functions are separated is captured by
the variable γ, which is explained in detail later in this section. The shareholders’
choice of γ is commonly observable.
At the same time, directors obtain a ﬁxed salary for their services on the board.
This salary must be suﬃciently high to ensure their participation. We assume that
directors are only willing to serve on the board if they get compensated for their
expected disutility of eﬀort associated with their task on the board. As will be
discussed below, directors’ personal cost of sitting on the compensation committee is
normalized to zero, while performing the oversight function on the audit committee
is associated with a personal cost. Audit committee members therefore receive a
ﬁxed pay for their services as overseers, which is denoted by ˆ w. A review of the 2006
Spencer Stuart Board Index shows it is not uncommon that boards pay committee
7member retainers and that the levels of these retainers diﬀer depending on the type
of the committee.1
Stage 2. The compensation committee sets CEO pay. In general, it has a whole
set of alternatives available, e.g., it can use linear or non-linear contracts and choose
between diﬀerent performance measures, including accounting earnings reports and
the share price. For the purpose of this paper, these diﬀerences are not essential.
What matters though is that the performance measure is manipulable through accrual
management or real earnings management such as reducing R&D expenses. We use
the term earnings management to include both types of activities. Linking pay to the
performance measure therefore provides the CEO with some incentives to engage in
earnings management. The connection between earnings management and CEO pay
is obvious if the bonus is based on the earnings report. In this case, the CEO will
have an incentive to manipulate current earnings at the expense of future earnings
if he has a shorter time horizon than shareholders (Feltham and Xie (1994), Dutta
and Gigler (2002)). When executive pay is based on stock or stock options, the CEO
is still able to beneﬁt from earnings manipulations if the market is not fully able to
undo these manipulations in pricing the stock (Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), Ewert
and Wagenhofer (2005)). Empirical studies provide evidence suggesting that this is
generally the case; that is, managers are indeed able to manipulate the stock price to
their beneﬁt through earnings management (Sloan (1996), Collins and Hribar (2000)).
We take the performance measure, M, as given, and consider linear compensation
schemes. CEO pay is w(M)=F + bM and consists of a ﬁxed component F and
a variable component bM,w h e r eb is interpreted as the pay-performance sensitivity
1For the 2006 Spencer Stuart Board Index see http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/
lib/SSBI-2006.pdf.
8of CEO compensation. The compensation committee’s task is therefore to set the
pay-performance sensitivity b and the ﬁxp a yF.
Stage 3. The CEO engages in a productive act, a1 ≥ 0, and a manipulative
act, a2 ≥ 0. The productive act positively aﬀects both the performance measure
and the ﬁnal cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm. In contrast, the manipulative act boosts only
the performance measure, possibly at the expense of long-term gross cash ﬂows. The
negative eﬀect of a2 on cash ﬂows may stem from distortions of the ﬁrm’s operating
and investment decisions as well as cost of potential litigation and loss of reputation.
At the same time, the audit committee chooses the monitoring intensity, e. Dili-
gent monitoring by the audit committee makes it more diﬃcult for the CEO to suc-
cessfully manipulate the performance measure. The monitoring eﬀort e captures the
time and attention the audit committee devotes to its duties like arranging meetings
with management to discuss annual and quarterly ﬁnancial statements, engaging in
vigorous debate, and asking probing questions. We model this by assuming that the
“productivity” of the manipulative act a2 is a decreasing function of e.I n o t h e r
words, higher monitoring reduces the CEO’s ability to manipulate the performance
measure. The performance measure is hence given by
M = m1a1 + m(e)a2,
with m1 > 0,m (e) > 0,a n dm0(e) < 0. For simplicity we assume in the following
that e ∈ [0,1] and m(e)=m2(1−e), with m2 > 0. Thus, monitoring is normalized to
take on values between zero and one, where e =0is the lowest level of monitoring. In
addition, we assume that the performance measure is more sensitive to the productive
act than to the manipulative act (m1 >m 2). This assumption assures that the
considered optimization problems are concave.
9The ﬁrm’s ﬁnal gross cash ﬂow (prior to compensation) is given by
Y = v1a1 − v(e)a2,
with v1 > 0,v (e) ≥ 0, and v0(e) ≤ 0. We allow for the possibility that v(e)=0
to capture situations where the manipulative act a2 does not directly destroy ﬁrm
value (independent of the monitoring eﬀort). This is the case for example if the CEO
engages in accrual management that boosts his pay but has no real eﬀect on the
ﬁrm’s operating and investment decisions. Nevertheless, even in this case activity
a2 is detrimental to shareholders as it leads to excessive CEO compensation. Our
qualitative results therefore do not depend on whether v(e) is positive or zero. For
simplicity, we assume in the following that v(e)=v2(1 − e), with v2 ≥ 0. Note that
our qualitative results carry over to the case where the monitoring eﬀort has no direct
eﬀect on Y ,i . e . ,w h e r ev(e)=v2.
All activities are unobservable. Directors’ personal cost of performing the mini-
mum level of oversight, e =0 , and the personal cost of setting CEO compensation
are normalized to zero. Choosing an oversight eﬀort above the minimum level in-
volves a private cost c(e), which is increasing and strictly convex, with c(0) = 0,
c0(0) = 0, and lim e→1c0(e)=∞. The CEO’s private cost of undertaking the activity
ai is c(ai)=0 .5a2
i for i =1 ,2.c (a1) is the standard eﬀort cost (or, equivalently,
reduced private beneﬁts). The cost of manipulation, c(a2), may stem from litigation,
reputation, or psychic costs. It is worth noting that one could assume that board
monitoring not only reduces the productivity of the manipulative act a2 but also in-
c r e a s e st h eC E O ’ sc o s to fm a n i p u l a t i o n ,c(a2). However, this would merely complicate
our exposition without altering the insights of our model.
Preferences and board structure. All parties are risk neutral and the risk-free
rate is zero. The CEO has no private wealth (limited liability) and his reservation
10utility is normalized to zero.
The CEO’s expected utility is
UCEO = w(M) − 0.5a
2
1 − 0.5a
2
2.
Shareholders’ goal is to maximize the net value of the ﬁrm,
V = Y − w(M) − ˆ w,
which is the ﬁnal gross cash ﬂow minus compensation paid to the CEO and the audit
committee.
To model the preferences of the board, we follow the approach in Hermalin and
Weisbach (1998), Hermalin (2005), and Adams and Ferreira (2007). The preferences
of individual committee members can be aggregated so that a committee acts as if it
were a single-player with a utility function that puts a positive weight β on ﬁrm value
and a negative weight on monitoring eﬀort. The audit committee’s utility function
c a nt h u sb es t a t e da s
Uaudit = βV +ˆ w − c(e).
As in Hermalin (2005), β is exogenously given and the result of all factors that
determine how the board weights the costs and beneﬁts of monitoring. The board’s
weight on ﬁrm value is expected to increase in the board’s shareholding and long term
interest in the ﬁrm, the concern for public opinion and reputation, and the degree to
w h i c ht h eb o a r di si n d e p e n d e n tf r o mt h eC E O .
The preferences of the compensation committee are more intricate. Through the
formation of committees, board functions are separated. However, the speciﬁce x t e n t
to which functions are separated depends on the composition of the two committees.
This follows because directors might sit on more than one committee and hence
11might be responsible for more than one task. Compensation committee members
who also serve on the audit committee will take into account that their choice of the
pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation will aﬀe c tt h e i rj o ba tt h ea u d i t
committee (i.e., the optimal level of monitoring). The level of task separation on
boards not only depends on the director overlap between the two committees, but
more generally on the degree of interaction between the committees, e.g., how often
the whole board meets or whether the chair of the compensation committee is also on
the audit committee. We refer to the degree of interaction between the two committees
as committee interlock. This committee interlock is captured by the variable γ ∈ [0,1].
An interlock of γ =1stands for a situation where committees are highly interlocked.
This is the case, for example, if the two committees consist of exactly the same
directors, which basically means that the whole board is responsible for both functions
(this case therefore also captures the board’s decision making when there are no
committees). In this case, the preferences of the two committees coincide, i.e., U1
comp =
Uaudit, and there is no task separation on the board. On the other hand, an interlock
of γ =0represents a situation where committees are not interlocked. This is the case
if the two committees consist of diﬀerent directors. The two board functions are then
fully separated, and the compensation committee’s preferences are U0
comp = βV. The
compensation committee ignores the cost of monitoring when setting CEO pay since
it is not involved in the oversight function. Of course, the committee interlock can lie
anywhere in between these two extremes. The compensation committee’s preferences
are therefore given by
U
γ
comp = γU
1
com +( 1− γ)U
0
com = βV + γ (ˆ w − c(e)).
In general, a lower committee interlock γ implies that the compensation committee
is less involved in the oversight function and hence less concerned about the cost of
12monitoring, which reﬂects situations where the level of task separation is greater. We
expect the interlock γ to decrease if the fraction of directors who are sitting on both
committees declines.
3R e s u l t s
3.1 Committee structure and decision making
We ﬁrst analyze the choice of activities in stage 3. Since a1,a 2, and e are unobservable,
we can assume without loss of generality that they are chosen simultaneously. The
CEO’s optimization problem is
max
a1,a2
b(m1a1 + m2(1 − e)a2) −
1
2
a
2
1 −
1
2
a
2
2,
taking e as given. The audit committee’s optimization problem is
max
e βV − c(e)+ˆ w,
taking a1 and a2 as given. Note that ˆ w is a constant in stage 3 and therefore does
not aﬀect the audit committee’s choice of e. In equilibrium, each party correctly
anticipates the other party’s action, that is, a1,a 2, and e are best responses to each
other.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium strategies a1,a 2, and e are jointly determined by the fol-
lowing ﬁrst-order conditions:
a1 = bm1, (1)
a2 = bm2(1 − e), (2)
β [v2 + bm2]a2 = c
0(e). (3)
13For a given level of monitoring, the CEO’s incentive to exert productive eﬀort and
his incentive to engage in manipulation both increase with the pay-performance sen-
sitivity b. Moreover, the CEO has a lower incentive to manipulate if the equilibrium
level of monitoring is greater. This follows because greater monitoring reduces the
productivity of a2, making it less attractive to engage in manipulation.
Manipulation by the CEO is detrimental for the board because it directly destroys
ﬁrm value (if v2 > 0) and boosts CEO compensation. When deciding on the moni-
toring intensity, the audit committee puts a weight of β on the beneﬁt of monitoring.
Since it has to bear the full cost of monitoring, it devotes too little attention to the
oversight task.
Of particular interest is the total eﬀect that a higher pay-performance sensitivity, b,
has on the level of monitoring and on the CEO’s action choices. The audit committee’s
optimal level of e is determined by substituting (2) into (3), which yields β[v2 +
bm2][bm2(1 − e∗)] − c0(e∗)=0 . It is straightforward to verify that monitoring is
increasing in b.I n t u i t i v e l y , w h e n b increases, monitoring becomes more important
to the board since the CEO’s direct incentive to manipulate gets stronger and his
bonus larger. While it is clear that a higher pay-performance sensitivity results in a
larger eﬀort a1, the total eﬀect on the manipulative act a2 is ambiguous. On the one
hand, a greater b directly motivates the CEO to engage in more manipulation. On
the other hand, it also improves the audit committee’s monitoring incentive, which
deters manipulation. Depending on which eﬀect is stronger, the manipulative act
either increases or decreases with b.
Lemma 2 As the pay-performance sensitivity b increases, the monitoring eﬀort e∗
and the productive act a∗
1 increase, while the manipulative act a∗
2 may increase or
decrease.
14Lemma 2 is proven in the appendix.
In stage 2, the compensation committee sets the pay F and b to maximize its
utility. Due to the limited liability assumption, the optimal ﬁxed payment F is zero.
The compensation committee’s problem is
max
b
βV − γ (c(e) − ˆ w), (4)
subject to (1), (2), (3) and b ≥ 0.
Note that in stage 2 the salary ˆ w is a constant and therefore does not aﬀect the
choice of b. We show in the appendix that the compensation committee’s optimal
level of b satisﬁes
[v1m1 − v2m2(1 − e)
2] − [2bm
2
1 +2 m
2
2(1 − e)
2b] (5)
+[bm2(1 − e)(v2 + m2b)(2− γ)
de
db
]=0 ,
where e is determined by (2) and (3).
In determining the optimal pay-performance sensitivity, the compensation com-
mittee takes into account the direct impact of b on the CEO’s choice of a1 and a2
(as expressed in the ﬁrst term in square brackets) and on the CEO’s compensation
(as expressed in the second term in square brackets). The board also considers the
positive eﬀect of b on the level of monitoring (as expressed in the last term in square
brackets). This last eﬀect is intuitive for γ =0 . In this case, the two committees are
distinct groups so that the compensation committee will push the audit committee’s
incentive to monitor by choosing a larger b.T h i s e ﬀect also occurs—but to a lower
extent—when the whole board is responsible for both tasks, i.e., when γ =1 .I nt h i s
case, the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation serves as a substitute for
commitment. To see this, suppose that the board was able to commit to a certain
level of monitoring prior to the CEO’s action choices. The board would then choose
15a monitoring intensity greater than the one implied by Lemma 1. This would be ben-
eﬁcial because the anticipation of diligent monitoring reduces the CEO’s incentive to
take manipulative actions. Due to the lack of commitment, however, the board will
instead enhance the pay-performance sensitivity b. By doing so, the board increases
its own incentive to engage in monitoring in stage 3, which credibly communicates to
the CEO that it will take its oversight function seriously.
Condition (5) leads to our ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1 As committees become less interlocked, the pay-performance sensitiv-
ity, b,i n c r e a s e s .
T h ee x t e n tt ow h i c ht h ec o m p e n s a t i o nc o m m i t t e ec o n s i d e r st h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of
b on e depends on the degree of committee interlock. For γ =1 , directors who design
the CEO incentive contract also have to perform the oversight function. Hence, when
choosing b, they take into account the cost of subsequent monitoring. If the committee
interlock decreases, the compensation committee is less involved in monitoring and
hence less concerned about the cost of monitoring. As a consequence, it will increase
the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation to further boost the oversight
eﬀort. This explains Proposition 1.
The next corollary follows directly from Lemma 2 and Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 As committees become less interlocked, the monitoring eﬀort e∗ and the
productive act a∗
1 increase, while the manipulative act a∗
2 m a yi n c r e a s eo rd e c r e a s e .
Another important question is how the committee structure aﬀects the expected
magnitude of earnings management, which is deﬁned by EM ≡ m2(1 − e)a2. The
answer to this question is not clear cut. Less interlocked committee structures (lower
16γ) lead to executive compensation schemes that are more performance sensitive. This
increases the audit committee’s attention devoted to monitoring and hence reduces
the magnitude of earnings management EM. However, as described in Lemma 2, the
eﬀect of a larger b on a2 is ambiguous. For this reason, EM can be either increasing
or decreasing in b,w i t hdEM/db = c00(e) − βbm2v2 − 3b2βm2
2.
We obtain an unambiguous link if we make some additional assumptions. Assume
that c00(e) is a constant, e.g., c, and let β
t be the level of β that satisﬁes βb(0)m2v2 +
3[b(0)]
2 βm2
2 = c, where b(0) is the b that satisﬁes (5) for γ =0 .
Proposition 2 For β<β
t, the level of earnings management increases when com-
mittees become less interlocked, dEM
dγ < 0.
When directors’ stake in the ﬁrm, β, is low, the attention devoted to monitoring is
low as well. As a consequence, the CEO’s expected marginal beneﬁt of manipulation
increases strongly when b increases. This eﬀect outweighs the eﬀect that an increase
in e has on EM, resulting in a net increase in EM.
3.2 The optimal board structure
Shareholder-value maximization. In stage 1, shareholders choose the structure
of the board, γ, with the objective to maximize ﬁrm value V . At the same time, the
audit committee members obtain a pay ˆ w for their services on the board. To ensure
their participation the pay ˆ w must compensate the audit committee for the expected
cost of monitoring.
S i n c et h ec h o i c eo ft h ec o m m i t t e ei n t e r l o c kγ is observable to all parties, the wage
ˆ w is not independent of γ.The lower the level of committee interlock, the higher is the
equilibrium level of b, and the higher is the equilibrium oversight eﬀort e. This implies
17that the audit committee will require a higher salary ˆ w if the committee interlock γ
is lower. Shareholders will take these eﬀects into consideration when choosing γ.
Shareholders problem in stage 1 is the following
Max
γ V = Y − w(M) − ˆ w,
subject to (1), (2), (3), (5), and the audit committee’s participation constraint ˆ w ≥
c(e).
Proposition 3 The committee interlock that maximizes ﬁrm value V is given by
γ = β.
Proposition 3 is proven in the appendix.
By selecting the committee interlock, γ, shareholders are able to control the com-
pensation committee’s choice of b. The optimal strategy is therefore to choose the γ
that induces the compensation committee to select the pay-performance sensitivity b
in stage 2 that maximizes ex ante ﬁrm value.
There are two forces at work that distort the compensation committee’s choice of
b relative to shareholders’ desired level of b.T h e ﬁrst distortion arises because the
compensation committee ignores the adverse ex ante eﬀect of a larger level of b on
the audit committee’s salary ˆ w, when choosing b, since ˆ w i sac o n s t a n ta tt h a tt i m e .
The compensation committee therefore tends to choose a level of b that is too large
from an ex ante perspective. A second distortion (this time in the other direction)
arises whenever the two committees are interlocked. In this case, the compensation
committee cares about the cost of monitoring c(e), because it is to some extent di-
rectly involved in the monitoring task. Since linking CEO pay closely to performance
increases the need for subsequent monitoring, the compensation committee is biased
18in favor of choosing lower levels of b. If committees are strongly interlocked, i.e., if
γ>β ,the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst, resulting in a pay-performance sensitivity
that is too small from shareholders’ ex ante perspective. For γ<βwe have the oppo-
site case, where the choice of b is too large relative to the desired level. However, for
γ = β, the two eﬀects are optimally balanced such that the compensation committee
will ﬁnd it optimal to choose the level of b that maximizes ex ante ﬁrm value.
CEO’s interests. In some corporations it might be reasonable to assume that the
CEO has the power to design the organization of the board. It is therefore interesting
to take a look at the committee structure, γ, that is optimal for the CEO.
Proposition 4 The committee interlock that maximizes the CEO’s utility, bM −
c(a1) − c(a2), is given by γ =0 .
The proof of Proposition 4 is in the appendix.
When the two committees become less interlocked, both the pay-performance
sensitivity b and the level of monitoring e increase. The ﬁrst eﬀect clearly beneﬁts
the CEO while the second eﬀe c th u r t sh i m .H o w e v e r ,a ss h o w ni nt h ea p p e n d i x ,t h e
ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second, leaving the CEO better oﬀ with less interlocked
committee structures.
Other factors that inﬂuence the optimal level of γ. Of course, in practice the
committee interlock in corporations is likely aﬀected also by other factors that we
have ignored in our study. There are several reasons that could cause shareholders
to choose a higher level of committee interlock than the one identiﬁed in Proposition
3. For example, shareholders may decide to limit the size of the board to save com-
pensation costs, reduce free-rider problems or due to lack of talent. This will likely
19increase the level of committee interlock, since regulatory standards establish require-
ments regarding the minimum size of committees as well as the level of independence
and ﬁnancial literacy. For example, the NYSE and NASD require listed companies
to maintain audit committees with at least three directors all of whom must be in-
dependent from management and ﬁnancially literate.2 Moreover, our model ignores
potential beneﬁts of communication between board members that perform diﬀerent
functions. The beneﬁts of information sharing between committees may provide a
counterweight to the eﬀects we have outlined in this study. Another, less obvious
reason for why shareholders may beneﬁt from a greater committee interlock emerges
from a lack of board independence from management. We devote the next section
to the study of how board dependence inﬂuences the optimal choice of committee
interlock.
3.3 Dependent boards
In recent years, boards of directors have been criticized for serving the interests of
CEOs rather than those of shareholders. Directors are said to be inclined to favor
executives because executives have some control over director compensation and over
the re-nomination process (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). We are therefore
interested in the question how the board’s dependence on the CEO aﬀects the optimal
level of committee interlock. A natural way to model dependence is to assume that
a dependent board beneﬁts from being friendly to the CEO. We therefore assume in
this section that the board’s utility is an increasing function of the CEO’s utility. The
audit and compensation committees’ preferences are then given by βV − c(e)+ˆ w +
δUCEO and βV − γ (c(e) − ˆ w)+δUCEO, respectively. The weight directors place on
2See NYSE Listed Company Manual §303.01, §303A.06, and §303A.07.
20the CEO’s utility, δ, is interpreted as the board’s degree of dependence. We assume
β>δso that it is not optimal for the board to make unbounded monetary transfers
from the ﬁrm to the CEO. This assumption implies that F =0remains optimal for
the board.
We know from the previous section that if the board is independent, δ =0 , the
shareholders’ optimal board structure is γ = β. This result no longer holds if the
b o a r di sd e p e n d e n to nt h eC E O .
Proposition 5 (i) When the board is dependent on the CEO (δ>0), ﬁrm value V
is maximized for γ>β .The CEO’s utility is maximized for γ =0 .
The proof is in the appendix.
When the board is dependent on the CEO, the committee interlock that maximizes
ﬁr mv a l u ei sl a r g e rt h a nt h eo n et h a ti so p t i m a lw h e nt h eb o a r di si n d e p e n d e n t .T o
s e et h i s ,n o t et h a tf o rγ = β, a dependent board is inclined to oﬀer the CEO a bonus
coeﬃcient b that is excessive from the perspective of shareholders. The reason is that
a dependent board is not only concerned about ﬁrm value and the cost of monitoring,
but also wishes to be friendly to the CEO. A higher degree of committee interlock
creates countervailing incentives as the compensation committee now more heavily
weights the monitoring cost when choosing b. This is akin to imposing an additional
cost of being friendly to the CEO. The optimal committee interlock is the one that
induces the compensation committee to select the pay-performance sensitivity that
maximizes ex ante ﬁrm value. However, note that even when the committee structure
is chosen optimally for shareholders, board dependence is nevertheless detrimental to
shareholders, as it leads to a reduced monitoring eﬀort.
214 Empirical Implications
T h ea c a d e m i cl i t e r a t u r eh a si d e n t i ﬁed and analyzed governance factors that are ex-
pected to inﬂuence the quality of the internal control process in corporations. Popular
governance indicators are, for instance, the size of boards or committees, directors’
degree of independence from the CEO, their stock ownership, and whether the CEO
is also the chairman of the board (Weisbach (1988), Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996),
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999)).
Our paper contributes to this literature by carving out another channel through
which board structure has an impact. We focus on task separation on boards, which
is arguably an important consequence of forming committees. The model provides
predictions relating the board structure to board decision making and organizational
performance. What matters for our predictions is the degree of committee interlock
on boards, γ. A straightforward way to measure this interlock in corporations is to
look at the extent to which boards have adopted committees. Generally, boards with
committees are expected to be less interlocked, i.e., employ a greater degree of task
separation, than boards without committees. For those ﬁrms that are required to
have board committees by regulation, possible proxies for interlock are, e.g., whether
or not the chairman of the compensation committee also sits on the audit committee
or the fraction of compensation committee members who also serve on the audit
committee.
For the purpose of illustration, it is interesting to take a look at the degree of inter-
lock in the 30 corporations comprising the Dow Jones Industrial Average. A review of
the 2005 proxy statements reveals that the size of the compensation committee ranges
from three to seven members, and the members of the compensation committee, on
22average, sit on 1.47 other committees. However, for 12 corporations no member of
the compensation committee also sits on the audit committee, and for ten corpora-
tions only one member sits on both committees. For only seven corporations, the
chairman of the compensation committee also serves on the audit committee. Thus,
for most ﬁrms, the degree of interlock between the compensation committee and the
audit committee is relatively small. This suggests that the introduction of committees
indeed results in a separation of the two functions of setting CEO compensation and
oversight.
Board structure and CEO compensation. Our analysis indicates a link be-
tween the structure of the board and CEO incentive pay. In particular, the model
predicts that a reduction in the degree of committee interlock leads to a greater pay-
performance sensitivity of CEO compensation. We are not aware of any existing
empirical research that examines this relation.
CEO compensation and earnings management. Policymakers and regulators
have devoted special attention to determining the cause of recent accounting scan-
dals. Many have argued that the increased use of equity incentive pay like stock
and stock options provided executives with excessive incentives to artiﬁcially inﬂate
reported earnings (see Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) for a discussion). Our
model shows that the relation between CEO incentives and earnings management is
less obvious than it appears at ﬁrst sight. The reason is that an increase in the pay-
performance sensitivity, b, not only has a positive eﬀect on the CEO’s direct incentive
to engage in manipulation, but also on the audit committee’s incentive to diligently
oversee the accounting process. Hence, the magnitude of earnings management, EM,
can increase or decrease with b, depending on which eﬀect is stronger. This might ex-
23plain why Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) ﬁnd no consistent evidence of a link
between the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and accounting
fraud.3
We only obtain an unambiguous negative link when the audit committee’s moni-
toring incentive is low, i.e., if β<β
t. However, even in this case, a positive relation
between the pay-performance sensitivity and the level of earnings management is not
a conclusive indication of the desirability of performance insensitive compensation
schemes. Shareholders are willing to accept the earnings management that goes along
with increased CEO incentives as long as the beneﬁt of higher incentives outweighs
the cost of earnings management.
Board structure and oversight. Our model predicts that a reduction in the de-
gree of committee interlock leads to better oversight of the ﬁnancial reporting process.
The link between board structure and monitoring is, however, indirect. A lower com-
mittee interlock results in a greater pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensa-
tion, which, in turn, enhances the audit committee’s incentive to carefully oversee the
reporting process.
There are no papers that directly test our prediction, as the level of board oversight
is hard to measure. However, there is a large body of empirical research that examines
the relation between board structure and earnings management. Our model suggests
that it is important to control for the pay-performance sensitivity when analyzing this
link. Without such a control variable, it is diﬃcult to interpret the empirical ﬁndings,
3However, there are other papers that ﬁnd some evidence on a positive relation between the level
of stock-based and in particular option-based compensation and the degree of earnings management
(see, e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon (forthcoming), Burns and Kedia (2006), Cheng and Warﬁeld
(2005), Peng and Röell (2004)).
24as a lower magnitude of earnings management can be the result of better monitoring
or the use of compensation systems that are less performance sensitive. To elaborate
on this issue, consider a study that ﬁnds no association between the presence of audit
committees and the level of earnings management. One might be tempted to conclude
that audit committees do not play an important role in the corporate governance
process. However, as our model shows, this might be the wrong conclusion. If one
accepts the assumption that the formation of committees leads to an increase in
task separation, our model predicts that the presence of audit committees positively
aﬀects the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation. This, in turn, changes
b o t ht h eC E O ’ sd i r e c ti n c e n t i v et om a n i p u l a t ea n dt h el e v e lo fb o a r do v e r s i g h t .T h e
two eﬀects work in opposite directions, implying that (on average) the magnitude
of earnings management may not change. This does not indicate, however, that the
adoption of audit committees has no eﬀect on corporate governance: the move toward
more performance sensitive pay systems (that is triggered by greater task separation)
also enhances the CEO’s incentive to work hard on the productive tasks, which has
a positive eﬀect on ﬁrm value.
The empirical literature that analyzes whether the existence of audit committees
inﬂuences the quality of the ﬁnancial reporting process produces mixed evidence.
While Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) and Beasley et al. (2000) ﬁnd a positive
association between audit committee presence and ﬁnancial reporting quality, Beasley
(1996) and Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2005) ﬁnd no such relation.
255C o n c l u s i o n
Arguably, two of the most important board functions are setting CEO pay and over-
seeing the ﬁnancial reporting process. Diﬀerent committees are responsible for per-
forming these functions, yet both functions are very much related. Accounting-based
compensation schemes encourage the CEO to manipulate earnings, which, in turn,
makes it necessary for the board to diligently perform the oversight role. Put dif-
ferently, CEO pay and the level of oversight are substitutes in reducing earnings
management. Audit committee members who are responsible for overseeing the re-
porting process will favour a lower pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation
than board members who are not involved in the oversight process. Our analy-
sis provides testable predictions concerning the relations between board committee
structure, CEO compensation, board oversight and earnings management.
Important incentives for board members to act as overseers of the ﬁnancial report-
ing process also stem from their ﬁduciary duty and potential liability claims (Gutier-
rez (2003)). We do not consider claims against directors in our model. However, our
qualitative results continue to hold when directors face legal penalties. The Sarbanes
Oxley Act of 2002 assigns directors serving on the audit committee a special respon-
sibility for overseeing the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial accounting process. Hence, when committee
interlock is reduced, the compensation committee will care less about potential legal
sanctions. This again implies that a lower committee interlock will lead to a stronger
pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, which, in turn, will increase the
audit committee’s incentive to carefully oversee the reporting process.
26Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .
The audit committee’s optimal level of e is determined by substituting (2) into (3),
which yields
β[v2 + bm2][bm2(1 − e
∗)] − c
0(e
∗)=0 . (6)
Applying the implicit function theorem shows that de
db =
βm2(1−e)(v2+2m2b)
βbm2(v2+m2b)+c00(e) > 0. The
CEO’s optimal choices of a1 and a2 are determined by (1) and (2), with e satisfying
(6). An increase in b has a positive eﬀect on a1, da1
db = m1 > 0. An increase in b can
have a positive or negative eﬀect on a2. T os e et h i sn o t et h a t
da2
db = m2(1−e)−bm2
de
db,
which is positive iﬀ −βb2m2
2 + c00(e) > 0,w h e r ee satisﬁes (6). To give an example,
suppose c(e)=0 .5e2. In this case, the total eﬀect of an increase in b on a2 is positive
for β< 1
b2m2
2 and negative for β> 1
b2m2
2. This is intuitive since a low β implies that
the monitoring eﬀect is muted, i.e., de
db is relatively small. Hence, for β< 1
b2m2
2, the
CEO’s incentive to engage in manipulation increases when b increases.
P r o o fo fE q u a t i o n( 5 ) .
Substituting (1), (2) and M = m1a1 + m2(1 − e)a2 into (4) yields
β
¡
bv1m1 − bv2m2(1 − e)
2 − b
2m
2
1 − m
2
2(1 − e)
2b
2 − ˆ w
¢
− γ (c(e) − ˆ w).
Since the salary ˆ w is a constant in stage 2, the ﬁrst derivative with respect to b is
β
¡
v1m1 − 2bm
2
1 − m2(1 − e)
2(v2 +2 m2b)
¢
(7)
+β
µ
2bm2(1 − e)(v2 + m2b) −
γ
β
c
0(e)
¶
de
db
=0 .
(Note that e is a function of b.) Inserting (2) into (3) and substituting this into (7)
gives (5).
27P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
Shareholders’ optimal strategy in stage 1 is to choose the board structure γ that
induces the compensation committee to select the level of b that maximizes stage 1
ﬁrm value. This level of b, denoted bV, can be determined by solving
max
b
v1a1 − v2(1 − e)a2 − bM − ˆ w,
s u b j e c tt o( 1 ) ,( 2 ) ,( 3 ) ,a n dˆ w ≥ c(e). I nt h eo p t i m a ls o l u t i o n ,i tm u s tb et h a t
ˆ w = c(e). It can be shown that bV satisﬁes
v1m1 − 2bm
2
1 − m2(1 − e)
2(v2 +2 bm2) (8)
+(2bm2(1 − e)(v2 + bm2) − c
0(e))
de
db
=0 .
Comparing (8) with (7) shows that the compensation committee will choose the
desired pay-performance sensitivity b = bV, if the committee interlock is γ = β.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
The utility of the CEO is b(m1a1 + m2(1 − e)a2) − 0.5a2
1 − 0.5a2
2. Substituting (1)
and (2) into this equation yields 0.5b2m2
1 +0 .5b2m2
2(1 − e(b))2.The ﬁrst derivative
with respect to b is
bm
2
1 + bm
2
2(1 − e)
2 − b
2m
2
2(1 − e)
de
db
, (9)
with de
db =
βm2(1−e)(v2+2m2b)
βbm2(v2+m2b)+c00(e) > 0. It is straightforward to show that (9) is always
positive for m1 ≥ m2 (which we have assumed) implying that the CEO is better oﬀ
when b increases.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
When the board is dependent on the CEO, the audit committee’s optimization prob-
28lem is
max
e β [v1a1 − v2(1 − e)a2 − b(m1a1 + m2(1 − e)a2) − ˆ w] − (c(e) − ˆ w)
+δ[b(m1a1 + m2(1 − e)a2) −
1
2
a
2
1 −
1
2
a
2
2],
taking a1 and a2 as given. The optimal monitoring eﬀort satisﬁes
β [v2a2 + bm2a2] − c
0(e) − δ[bm2a2]=0 . (10)
Substituting (1) and (2) into (10) yields:
βbm2(1 − e)(v2 + bm2) − c
0(e) − δb
2m
2
2(1 − e)=0 . (11)
The level of b that maximizes ﬁrm value in stage 1, denoted bV
dep, must satisfy
(8) with de
db =
β(1−e)(v2m2+2bm2
2)−δ2bm2
2(1−e)
βbm2(v2+bm2)+c00(e)−δb2m2
2 and e satisfying (11). The compensation
committee, however, chooses the level of b that maximizes
max
b
β (v1a1 − v2(1 − e)a2 − bM − ˆ w) − γ (c(e) − ˆ w)+δ[bM −
1
2
a
2
1 −
1
2
a
2
2].
subject to (1), (2), and (11). It can be shown that the compensation committee’s
choice of b satisﬁes
¡
v1m1 − 2bm
2
1 − m2(1 − e)
2(v2 +2 m2b)
¢
+
µ
2bm2(1 − e)(v2 + m2b) −
γ
β
¡
βbm2(1 − e)(v2 + bm2) − δb
2m
2
2(1 − e)
¢¶
de
db
+
δ
β
[m
2
1b + m
2
2(1 − e)
2b − m
2
2(1 − e)b
2de
db
]=0 .
with de
db =
β(1−e)(v2m2+2bm2
2)−δ2bm2
2(1−e)
βbm2(v2+bm2)+c00(e)−δb2m2
2 and e satisfying (11).
It is straightforward to show that the last term in square brackets is positive
given m1 ≥ m2. Hence, in order to induce the compensation committee to choose the
desired pay-performance sensitivity b = bV
dep, it must be that γ>β .
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